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Abstract When people rely on the web to gather and distribute information, they
can build a sense of trust in the websites with which they interact. Understanding the
correlates of trust in most websites (general website trust) and trust in websites that
one frequently visits (familiar website trust) is crucial for constructing better models
of risk perception and online behavior. We conducted an online survey of active
Internet users and examined the associations between the two types of web trust and
several independent factors: information technology competence, adverse online
events, and general dispositions to be trusting or cautious of others. Using a series of
nested ordered logistic regression models, we find positive associations between
general trust, general caution, and the two types of web trust. The positive effect of
information technology competence erases the effect of general caution for general
website trust but not for familiar website trust, providing evidence that general trust
and self-reported competence are stronger associates of general website trust than
broad attitudes about prudence. Finally, the experience of an adverse online event
has a strong, negative association with general website trust, but not with familiar
website trust. We discuss several implications for online behavior and suggest
website policies that can help users make informed decisions about interacting with
potentially risky websites.
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1 Introduction
Trust is an essential part of social interaction (Cook et al. 2009a, b). Without the
possibility of trust, individuals would be less likely to begin new relationships and it
would be more difficult to maintain existing ones. As a result of the recent explosion
in online social interaction, questions surrounding trust in web-based systems have
moved to center stage. The challenges and opportunities related to building online
trust are compelling, in part because of the sheer diversity and ubiquity of online
social experiences. Even the most mundane requirements of daily life are
increasingly fulfilled on the web. We communicate with friends and family, search
for restaurants and movies, pay bills, and shop online. We are captivated and
entertained by digital audio, video, and a wide variety of images from a myriad of
sources both professional and amateur. In the course of performing these quotidian
activities, we are invited to broadcast our experiences and opinions through viral
communication channels such as Facebook (an online social networking site) and
Twitter (a service for searching and sharing short messages and updates). At the
same time, the web has facilitated popular new forms of social collaboration such as
the massively distributed creation of an encyclopedia (Wikipedia) or the aggregation
of opinions and reviews on everything from movies and music to restaurants,
plumbers, doctors, and hotels.
In all of these online interactions, trust is at issue, because in each case, there are risks
and uncertainties of various types. Online purchases can put our tangible assets at grave
risk, while our reputations are clearly at risk when we share personal expertise and
opinions online. The complexity of many online systems also makes uncertainty a
central issue. With varying levels of knowledge concerning how systems operate and
how our information may be used comes ambiguity about the potential outcomes of our
foray into this online world. While the operation of some systems may seem relatively
simple and straightforward, a lack of transparency on the part of the designers can create
significant uncertainty about other web-based systems with which we interact. Taking a
detailed and specific view of trust provides a lens through which we can understand
more fully the nature of the risks and uncertainties involved in a world in which the
boundaries of our online and offline interactions are blurred.
A lack of trust in online interactions can have serious consequences. When trust is
lacking, communication may be less effective, and working relationships may
become less fruitful (Olson and Olson 2000a, b). Lack of trust is also cited as one of
the most common reasons consumers choose not to purchase from an online retailer
(Grabner-Krauter and Kaluscha 2003), fail to integrate web services such as email
systems or social networking sites into their daily activities (Harris and Goode
2004), or shy away from online individual relationships and group memberships.
The profiles of these risks and uncertainties are not only a function of the
characteristics of distinct contexts (e.g., financial transactions vs. personal
communications) but also of diverse patterns of use. Some individuals interact
infrequently and tenuously with websites, never integrating web-based tools or
services into their lives in meaningful ways. Many others, however, form durable
relationships with the websites they use on a daily basis. For these individuals,
habitual interactions with specific websites can lead them to perceive risks and
uncertainties differently and respond to them in unique ways.
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In this article, we focus on individual perceptions of trust in websites, or what we
call, web trust. We examine two distinct types of web trust—general website trust
and familiar website trust—and indicate their significance for online behavior and
interaction. To do this, we examine the relationships between sociodemographic
characteristics, attitudes, online activity, and the experience of adverse online events
with these two types of web trust. Using data from a survey of active Internet users,
we test several hypotheses and discuss the implications of our results for behavior,
attitudes, and trust in online environments. Finally, we discuss the implications of
our findings for policies and practices on the web.
2 Defining Trust
A central problem for building trust is the initial lack of information about the intentions or
behavior of others. This deficiency of information generates uncertainty, while the stakes
in a given interaction create risk (Cook et al. 2005a, b). Together, risk and uncertainty
produce the conditions that bring about the need for trust. If there are no uncertainties or
risks, then trust has no real meaning in a situation (Hardin 2002; Luhmann 1979). Trust
and trustworthiness are often assumed to have the same meaning, but the two terms are
conceptually different. A review of many different definitions across disciplines
indicates that trust most often refers to attitudes, dispositions, or beliefs that we have
about others whom we hope will be trustworthy (McLeod 2008). The development of
trust requires time and experience between parties. On the other hand, trustworthiness
usually refers to a property, personality trait, or characteristic of an individual whom we
may trust (Cook et al. 2009a, b; McLeod 2008). Trustworthiness is important for
determining when trust is warranted (McLeod 2008), and it is often viewed as a
precursor to trust because an individual may assess another as trustworthy without any
prior interaction. Individuals may rely on socially valued status characteristics (age,
occupation, education) to gauge one’s trustworthiness when these attributes are
associated with higher performance expectations (Cook et al. 2005a: 30).
Some scholars argue that the most accurate uses of the term “trust” should be reserved
for interpersonal relationships between humans (Hardin 2002). In his encapsulated-
interest view, Hardin argues that trust is much more than an acceptance of risk or
cooperation between individuals. Relational trust can only develop over time in a direct
relationship, when one party to the relation believes the other party has incentive to act
in her interest or to take her interests to heart (Cook et al. 2005a, b; Hardin 2001).
If the encapsulated-interest view of trust were on one end of a continuum of types
of interpersonal trust, general trust might be thought of as the other end. General
trust refers to an individual’s default expectations about the trustworthiness of other
people in the absence of a specific context (Rotter 1967; Yamagishi and Yamagishi
1994; Yamagishi 1998). General trust is viewed as a rough accumulation of attitudes
and beliefs in multiple contexts and through experience over time (Cook 2001). It is
this context-independence that makes general trust difficult to reconcile with
interpersonal trust since the latter is intrinsically tied to the circumstances of social
interaction (Hardin 2002). Despite its imprecise nature, general trust is consistently
and strongly correlated with a variety of other cooperative and trusting behaviors.
Researchers have examined general trust as a predisposition for cooperative and pro-
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social behaviors in a variety of environments (Yamagishi 1998) and across cultures
(Hayashi et al. 1982; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994).
High general trust implies a belief in the benevolence of others’ intentions, while low
general trust indicates an inclination to adopt a guarded, more skeptical view of others
(Yamagishi 1998). Importantly, high general trust does not necessarily equate with
gullibility (Rotter 1967). In fact, discretion and caution toward others are both highly
related to trust, but they are independent concepts (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994).
Higher general trust is sometimes associated with lower dispositions to be cautious of
others, and individuals with high trust and low caution are more likely to engage in a
wider variety of risky but potentially profitable and beneficial interactions (Yamagishi
2001). Individuals who are more trusting and less cautious of others open themselves to
many potentially rewarding opportunities (Yamagishi 2001). These individuals
experience risks that they may not be prepared to handle without a stronger sense of
prudence. General trust and caution are not always inversely related, however
(Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). Many individuals indicate that they are highly
trusting but also highly cautious in their interactions with others. Prudence and caution
are not necessarily indicative of distrust (Yamagishi et al. 1999). In fact, the
combination of high caution and high trust may explain why some individuals engage
in social interaction in the presence of different types of uncertainty (e.g., anonymous
partners, indeterminate outcomes) while also being discerning of potential threats and
remaining attentive to the risks (Gordon 2007; Markoczy 2003; Yamagishi et al. 1999).
3 Trust in Online Contexts
There are many sources of uncertainty and risk in online environments. Monetary,
psychological, and interpersonal risks abound when we provide information about
ourselves on the Internet. In addition, individuals face uncertainty about the accuracy,
credibility, and sources of information shared online (Cheshire et al. 2010). Anonymity
and a general lack of interaction cues in online environments can magnify perceptions of
uncertainty and risk, making trust essential but also difficult to assess (Kollock 1999).
Despite collective appreciation of the importance of trust in explaining the extent and
form of individuals’ online participation, consensus on the meaning of trust in specific
online interactions has yet to emerge. Online trust has been the focus of a wide variety of
research in computer-mediated communication, human–computer interaction, and
related fields (Grabner-Krauter and Kaluscha 2003; Olson and Olson 2000a, b;
Riegelsberger et al. 2003). However, this literature uses the term “trust” to refer to
several related but somewhat distinct concepts that often confuse or conflate many
different ideas (Cheshire and Cook 2004; Grabner-Krauter and Kaluscha 2003;
Grabner-Krauter et al. 2006). In online contexts, the conflation of trust with related
terms such as credibility, security, surety, and reliability has led to a surplus of complex
conceptual models at the expense of consistency and clarity in the use of trust-like ideas
(Nissenbaum 2004). When notions of trust are poorly or inaccurately defined, we lose
the ability to unpack key concepts and examine meaningful determinants and effects.
This type of conceptual confusion makes it difficult to relate distinct studies about trust
to one another and to identify the most salient findings about behavior across different
online and offline contexts of interaction. From a practical point of view, we also lose
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the ability to undertake constructive repair when violations of online trust occur in part
because we do not know the underlying source of the problem.
One of the major points of contention in the online trust literature is whether
notions of trust that describe interpersonal relationships can be similarly applied to
relationships with online entities such as websites. Some scholars have argued firmly
that “people trust people, not technology” (Friedman et al. 2000). Others have
argued the opposite, suggesting that because we tend to anthropomorphize our
interactions with applications and information (Nass et al. 1994), we need not make
a distinction between interpersonal trust and human–system trust (Marsh and Dibben
2003). Both perspectives have merit, but they may lead to different implications for
users, systems, or those who design online systems.
Interpersonal trust largely hinges on the uncertainty and risk that comes from the
possibility of betrayal by another individual (Baier 1986; Hardin 2002; McLeod 2008).
Websites and most information systems do not choose to betray in an authentic way
because they lack agency (Friedman et al. 2000). However, online systems can be
unreliable, present false or incomplete information, or be insecure environments for
information sharing. Even if an online system is not capable of sentient betrayal, those
who build and maintain it are able to influence the actions and behaviors of the system
(Bargh and McKenna 2004). Website operators and designers are also accountable for
the malfeasance, fraud, and deceit that occur in the context of the systems they manage
or design. In this view, an online system is actually a proxy for the decisions and
implementations of its designers. Although trust is not truly dyadic1 between humans
and Internet systems or websites, the experience of risk, uncertainty, and even betrayal
is arguably very similar to that of interpersonal trust from the perspective of the user. It
is for this reason that trust in websites and systems is meaningful to users even if there
are important semantic and scholarly distinctions to be made between these concepts.
3.1 Web Trust: General and Familiar Trust in Websites
General trust in the offline social world has a direct analog in the context of
interactions with websites. We call an individual’s broad, context-independent
attitudes about the trustworthiness of typical websites on the Internet general website
trust. When individuals interact or exchange information using the web as a
medium, they are exposed to a variety of uncertainties and risks. Broad based,
abstracted dispositions provide a foundation for our assessments of risk and
uncertainty on the Internet. General trust attitudes will often be supplemented by
individual experience with specific websites over time. In turn, the long-term
aggregation of specific experiences may alter general perceptions of website trust. In
this way, general website trust forms a key part of an ongoing evolutionary cycle of
online experience, attitudes, and behaviors.
1 Some key components of relational trust include perceptions, risk-taking, experiences, reactions, and
interpretations of others’ behavior over time (Cook 2001; Hardin 2002). These components are essential
for both parties in a given dyad. In interactions with Internet systems and websites, the experience is
unilateral: the user faces risk and uncertainty and may modify her behavior based on personal experience
or third-party reputations (Cook et al. 2009a, b). Internet systems, however, rarely modify their reactions
to risk and uncertainty based on “experience” with specific users over time or do so in extremely limited
ways.
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Individuals can also develop more specific perceptions about the trustworthiness
of the websites and information systems they use on a regular basis. We refer to this
type of web trust as familiar website trust. Like situational trust (Marsh and Dibben
2003), familiar website trust focuses on a clear circumstance or setting. Perceptions
of trust related to websites that are a part of people’s daily habits are arguably more
circumscribed than for the general category of all websites. These attitudes are not
only context specific but also informed by particular histories of contact and
established patterns of regular interactions. In order to examine the differences
between general and familiar website trust, we analyze them as separate components
of the larger concept of web trust.
These two types of web trust are comparable to system trust, which exists when a
computer or information system is assumed to operate in a predictable or reliable
way (Grabner-Krauter and Kaluscha 2003). Thus, general and familiar website trust
only deal with the perceptions that individuals develop about websites or systems,
not their interpersonal relationships mediated through communication technology.
Our use of the term “web trust” is also distinct from the evaluation of specific
aspects of websites that affect the believability or authenticity of content. For
example, trust in specific website information content such as layout, color schemes,
use of photographs, and writing style is more accurately described as web credibility
(Fogg et al. 2001; Fogg and Tseng 1999).
4 Hypotheses
We develop five sets of hypotheses about online activity, general trust, general caution,
information technology competence, and the experience of an adverse online event on
the two types of web trust (general and familiar) we have distinguished. In each case,
we hypothesize and subsequently examine these relationships as associational effects.
There is no way to accurately establish time order and direct influence in a self-report
cross-sectional survey, but a more important issue is that there is unquestionably a
reciprocal relationship between behaviors, dispositions, and attitudes about web trust.
Behaviors and dispositions influence experiences and vice versa. For both
convenience and consistency, our hypotheses frame web trust as an outcome, but it
is essential to proper interpretation of our results that we avoid causal inferences at this
point and focus on direct associations. In future extensions of our work, we intend to
conduct longitudinal research to mitigate this limitation.
When individuals frequently engage in various online activities, they also develop
familiarity with those activities. Familiarity is a perception based on knowledge and
experience that a given set of situations or interactions are known and understood.
When individuals are more familiar with a given situation, transaction, or individual,
their perception of uncertainty tends to be lower (Luhmann 1979). As we have
argued, uncertainty and risk are essential conditions for the meaningful application
of conceptions of trust. Personal experience with a given situation or partner over
time has the potential to build trust (Blau 1964). Empirical work supports this effect
in online interactions as well. In a study of the users of a large online retailer,
familiarity with a specific website was related to increased trust in the retailer, as
well as more frequent inquiries about products and a greater number of purchases
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(Gefen 2000). Awareness and frequent use of websites have also been shown to be
significantly associated with trust in consumer websites in general (Yoon 2002). All
other things being equal, we expect higher frequency of online activity to reduce
uncertainty through awareness and to be positively associated with the two forms of
web trust.
H1.a-b. Ceteris paribus, a higher frequency of online activity is positively associated
with higher (a) general website trust and (b) familiar website trust.
General trust is a default set of expectations about the trustworthiness of others
(Yamagishi et al. 1999). Those with high general trust assume that most individuals
are trustworthy until experience reveals otherwise. So, high general trust reflects an
attitude of risk and uncertainty acceptance or a lack of perceived risk and uncertainty
(Yamagishi 2001). Those with higher degrees of general trust should be less deterred
from engaging in risky or uncertain activities, more prone to try new activities, and
more likely to repeat these activities.
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals do behave differently on the Internet
depending on their general attitudes about trusting others. For example, Gefen
(2000) found that an individual’s disposition towards trusting others was a primary
factor influencing behavior in online retailer interactions. Similar results have been
found for the effect of general trust in online banking (Suh and Han 2002) and
consumer trust in E-Commerce systems (Chen and Dhillon 2003). Consistent with
this line of research, we expect higher levels of general trust to be positively related
to general and familiar website trust.
H2.a-b. Ceteris paribus, higher general trust is positively associated with higher (a)
general website trust and (b) familiar website trust.
General trust is often negatively correlated with general caution (Yamagishi and
Yamagishi 1994), but the two dispositions tend to operate independently in a variety
of contexts. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) find that individuals with low general
trust are often highly cautious, but the reverse is not as common. In fact, a significant
proportion of individuals tend to be both highly trusting and highly cautious,
suggesting that prudence does not imply distrust of others (Yamagishi et al. 1999).
We have already argued that general trust should be positively associated with the
two forms of web trust. However, engaging in risky and uncertain situations does not
necessarily entail gullibility. Those who engage in risk-taking behaviors also tend to
make more careful decisions compared to those who normally avoid risky and
uncertain situations (Yamagishi 2001; Yamagishi et al. 1999). High general trust
together with high general caution may signify an inclination to engage in risky and
uncertain interactions while also maintaining discretion and prudence (Gordon 2007;
Markoczy 2003; Yamagishi et al. 1999).
Although general trust tends to vary widely within communities, Yamagishi and
his colleagues (Yamagishi et al. 1999; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994) have shown
that general caution is not only independent from general trust, but that prudence is
fairly common among high and low trusters. Furthermore, there is fairly consistent
evidence that prudence among Americans has been growing over time, independent
of attitudes about trust, benevolence, or other aspects of human nature (Yamagishi et
al. 1999). In uncertain and risky environments, it is reasonable to practice discretion
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even as one remains open to new opportunities and interactions. Controlling for
one’s disposition to trust others, we expect general caution to be positively
associated with both forms of web trust.
H3.a-b. Ceteris paribus, higher general caution is positively associated with higher
(a) general website trust and (b) familiar website trust.
Knowledge of information technologies and systems is tied to one’s understanding of
the functionality, design, and use of those technologies (Horrigan 2007, p. 35). As one
becomes more familiar with web site procedures and design, it can reduce uncertainty
and increase one’s understanding of Internet situations (Gefen et al. 2003). Individuals
who are more proficient with information technology and the Internet tend to
recognize threats such as violations of security and privacy (Hoffman et al. 1999).
Thus, we argue that higher levels of self-reported information technology competence
should positively relate to the two forms of web trust.
H4.a-b. Ceteris paribus, higher levels of information technology competence are
positively associated with higher (a) general website trust and (b) familiar
website trust.
The experience of an adverse online event is an important problem for web trust.
Potentially harmful online events can range from annoying distractions (e.g., spam
email) to malicious experiences (e.g. viruses, identity theft) with potentially injurious
financial, social and legal outcomes (Preece 2004). Information and knowledge
about the potential risks of online interaction is important, but information alone is
not always enough to change behavior.
The occurrence of a negative experience highlights the risks and uncertainties
surrounding engagement in these activities and can weaken confidence in the
security and reliability of a given system. Among scholars and producers of online
systems, there is a vision of online trust that Nissenbaum (2001) describes as,
“trustworthiness as security, or trust through security” (p.637). In response, a
common view among security and information technology specialists is to lock
down computer systems to make them as impenetrable as possible to attack in order
to increase trust. These attempts to create assurances can increase the perceptions of
security, but may also “squeeze trust out of the picture,” since trust depends on
uncertainty and risk (Nissenbaum 2001, p. 656). Despite differences in opinions
about how to address online threats, there is clear agreement about the deleterious
effects of adverse events on trust in online systems and environments. The
experience of an adverse online event should be negatively associated with both
forms of web trust.
H5.a-b. Ceteris paribus, the experience of an adverse online event is negatively
associated with higher (a) general website trust and (b) familiar website trust.
5 Methodology
To examine our research hypotheses, we analyzed data from a survey of online
behaviors and attitudes. Our web-based survey included questions in four primary
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areas: (1) sociodemographic characteristics; (2) frequency of online activity
questions; (3) attitudinal questions about general trust and caution; and (4)
agreement statements related to website trust.
We managed the creation and distribution of the survey using the open-source
survey tool, LimeSurvey. This system provided us with control over the presentation
of our survey, while ensuring the anonymity and confidentiality of our respondents.
We first distributed the survey to a small convenience sample that served as a pilot
test (N=70). The pilot survey led to several small changes in question presentation,
ordering and wording. The final instrument contained 88 questions and took
approximately 15 min to complete. The final sample size was N=971.
5.1 Sample and Procedure
We recruited participants by posting advertisements for our survey on the
community volunteer request section of the popular online classified listing service,
Craigslist.org, in Atlanta, Georgia and Chicago, Illinois.2 Our survey request was
also reposted to websites that aggregate online survey and research opportunities
drawn from many sources, including Craigslist.org. The survey announcement
indicated that we were interested in learning more about Internet use and attitudes,
and that we would offer $5 gift cards to a popular online retailer to the first 200
participants who successfully completed the survey over a 5-day period. The
recruitment posting was designed to appeal to those who are interested in social
research, while providing the potential for a small financial gift. Thus, our sample is
most accurately described as Internet users who are familiar with online classified
sites such as Craiglist.org and are interested in social research and/or the potential for
a $5 gift card.
The survey was active for five calendar days in July, 2008. During this period,
1,545 individuals recorded unique entries in our survey database. Of these, 1,213
participants fully completed the survey (79% completion rate). To identify
suspicious responses (e.g., individuals who attempted to rush through the survey
for a chance at a gift card), we calculated the standard deviation of each participant’s
group of responses on each page of the survey. This method allowed us to find
respondents who were answering questions with almost the same response every
time. Given the many different types of questions (approximately 5–15 questions per
page), it was unlikely that any participant could provide meaningful answers with
little deviation across many different types of questions. Furthermore, several groups
of questions included reverse-coded items, so a respondent who answered
consistently (e.g., all 1s, 3s or 7s) would have contradicted herself several times.
Forty-eight participants (3.9%) had standard deviations close to zero for three or
more groups of questions and were subsequently flagged for review. After
eliminating suspicious data and respondents with 10% missing data or more, the
final valid N=971. Univariate statistics for all variables in our analyses are shown in
Table 1.
2 The community volunteer section of Craigslist is a designated place to request participation for surveys,
clinical trials, non-profit activities, and other volunteer work.
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5.2 Dependent Variables
General website trust and familiar website trust Our measure of general website
trust is a seven-point Likert-style agreement statement, “I think most websites are
trustworthy,” (1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Somewhat Disagree, 4=Neither
Disagree or Agree, 5=Somewhat Agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly Agree). Familiar
website trust is also a single seven-point Likert-style agreement statement, “I find it
easy to trust websites that I use on a daily basis.” This question uses the same
ordered categories listed above. These measures for general website trust and
familiar website trust were based on comparable questions from the Trust and
Privacy surveys from the Pew Internet & American Life project (www.pewinternet.
org). Both measures are ordinal, and the distributions of the ordered responses to
each type of web trust question are approximately normally distributed. However,
both general website trust (skewness=−.22) and familiar website trust (skewness=
−.56) are slightly negatively skewed. The distributions of our two dependent
variables indicate sufficient variation within our online sample.
5.3 Independent Variables
General trust and caution We measured general trust and caution using Yamagishi’s
scale (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). The instrument is comprised of ten
agreement statements including five general trust and five general caution items.
Yamagishi’s scale has been replicated and validated in many diverse studies and
continues to be used to measure general trust and caution within and between
societies (e.g., Cook et al. 2009a, b; Markoczy 2003; Yamagishi 2001). Consistent
with prior research (e.g., Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994), the trust and caution
scales are negatively correlated (r=−.15, p<.001).
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for all variables in analyses
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Age 32.73 10.48 18 69
Education 3.64 1.23 1 6
Female .59 .49 0 1
Online Activity 2.25 .88 1 5
General Trust 4.34 1.09 1 7
General Caution 4.42 .88 1 7
Adverse Online Events .48 .50 0 1
IT Knowledge 4.99 1.15 1 7
General Website Trust 4.16 1.36 1 7
Familiar Website Trust 4.84 1.34 1 7
N=971; education is reported on the following scale: 1 = “Some High School,” 2 = “High School
Graduate,” 3 = “Some College,” 4 = “College Graduate,” 5 = “Some Postgraduate,” 6 = “Postgraduate”
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The general trust index is computed as the average of five items: “Most people
are basically honest,” “Most people are basically good-natured and kind,” “If
anything, I trust others,” “Most people trust others,” and “Most people are
trustworthy.” Responses range from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” on
the same seven-point Likert-style agreement scale described above. The general trust
items are highly related (Cronbach’s α=.85).
The general caution scale also has five items that are averaged to create a single
index: “One can avoid falling into trouble by assuming that all people have a vicious
streak,” “You cannot be too cautious in dealing with others,” “We do not always
have to guard ourselves against being used by someone” (reverse coded), “If you are
not careful enough, people will take advantage of you,” and “It is safer to believe
that everyone has the capacity to be malicious.” The general caution items are highly
related (Cronbach’s α=.62).
Adverse events The adverse online event measure is a dichotomous variable created
from a single yes/no response question: “Have you, personally, ever had a bad
experience or adverse event on the Internet? An adverse event is any unexpected bad
experience in which you, your online accounts, or your computer was attacked or
violated in some way that led to a negative consequence (e.g., virus attack, identity
theft, password compromise).” Almost half of our sample indicated that they had
experienced at least one adverse online event (48%).
Frequency of online activity Our measure of overall online activity is an index
created by averaging the responses of our participants on 20 individual questions in
four major groups of online activities: communication (sending instant messages,
email), content creation (blogging, posting comments), financial transactions
(purchasing, online auction participation), and digital downloading (downloading
audio, video and software). The activity scale items asked how often the respondent
engaged in each activity in an average week on a five-point ordered scale: (1=Less
than once, 2=1-3 times, 3=4–6 times, 4=7–9 times, 5=10+ times). The online
activity items are highly related (Cronbach’s α=.86).
Information and technology (IT) knowledge The IT knowledge scale is designed to
measure one’s overall level of comfort and self-described knowledge about
information technology. We constructed a measure of IT Knowledge based on the
average of the responses to two items: “I fully understand most of the technology I
use on a daily basis,” and “I usually know enough about the source of online
information to decide whether I trust it.” These questions were based on similar
items about technology competence and familiarity from the Pew Internet &
American Life Project. Both of our questions use the seven-point Likert-style
agreement statements described above. The two items are highly correlated (r=.46,
p<.001).
Sociodemographic measures Participants in the survey were asked to report their
age in years, gender (recoded to a single binary variable called female), and
education level on a six-item ordinal scale (1=Some High School, 2=High School
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Graduate, 3=Some College, 4=College Graduate, 5=Some Postgraduate, and 6=Post-
Graduate Degree).
6 Results
We used ordered logistic regression with the maximum-likelihood method of
estimation to test our hypotheses without assuming equal distances between the
ordered categories of the two dependent variables. Tables 2 and 3 display the ordered
log-odds coefficients for each independent variable on general website trust and
familiar website trust, respectively. The results for each table are presented across
four nested regression models. Model 1 includes sociodemographic items and online
activity. The next three models add key predictor variables in steps: general trust and
caution (Model 2), information technology knowledge (Model 3), and the experience
of an adverse online event (Model 4). The model fit and improvement statistics are
also provided for comparison within each table.
To help illustrate how varying response levels of key variables lead to tangible
differences in general and familiar website trust, we used example profiles to create
predicted probabilities. The predicted probabilities are created by solving the
complete ordered logistic regression equation (model 4 in each regression) for each
independent factor. The result is a predicted probability for all ordered categories of
general and familiar website trust. Each row of the table gives the probability of the
indicated level of the dependent variable, given the value of the key independent
variable in the corresponding column. For each column of predicted probabilities,
Table 2 Nested ordinal logistic regression models for general website trust
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age .02 (.01)*** .01 (.01)† .01 (.01)* .01 (.01)*
Education .05 (.05) −.01 (.05) −.01 (.05) −.01 (.05)
Female −.04 (.12) −.12 (.12) −.15 (.12) −.16 (.12)
Online Activity .30 (.07)*** .14 (.07)* .13 (.07)* .14 (.07)*
General Trust .69 (.06)*** .62 (.06)*** .62 (.06)***
General Caution .19 (.07)** .10 (.07) .11 (.07)




Log Likelihood −1,639.81 −1,575.12 −1,561.77 −1 559.77
Likelihood
Ratio χ2
31.10*** 160.47*** 187.18*** 191.17***
Pseudo R2 .00 .04 .06 .06
Model Improvement
χ2
30.68*** 124.51*** 26.44*** 3.99*
N=971; coefficients are ordered log-odds, with standard errors in parentheses
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, † p<.1
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one variable was held at a theoretically important value (indicated by column
heading), while all other values were kept at the median for the sample (See notes in
Table 4 for median values). For example, the first two columns in Table 4 show the
predicted probabilities for the seven levels of general and familiar website trust when
information technology knowledge is high (7) and all of the other variables in the
model are held at the median values. The predicted probabilities indicate that
individuals with high IT knowledge are much more likely to have higher web trust
(y=4, 5, 6, 7) than lower web trust (y=1, 2, 3).
6.1 Online Activity
Hypotheses H1.a and H1.b predict that the frequency of online activity will be
positively associated with general website trust and familiar website trust,
respectively. Model 1 in Table 2 shows that increasing levels of online activity are
positively related to general website trust (coef.=.30, p<.001). This effect is
sustained across all four models. However, frequency of online activity does not
appear to be related to familiar website trust in Model 1 of Table 3 (coef.=.04, p=n.s.).
In fact, the effect of online activity actually shows a significant negative effect in
models 2–4. We explore this surprising finding in the discussion below. Hypothesis 1.
a is supported, but H1.b is not supported.
6.2 General Trust and Caution
We predict that general trust and general caution will be positively associated with
general website trust (H2.a and H3.a) and familiar website trust (H2.b and H3.b). We
find significant positive effects for general trust (coef.=.69, p<.001) and for caution
Table 3 Nested ordinal logistic regression models for familiar website trust
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age .01 (.01)** .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
Education −.01 (.05) −.07 (.05) −.07 (.05) −.07 (.05)
Female .17 (.12) −.08 (.12) .07 (.12) .07 (.12)
Online Activity .04 (.07) −.14 (.07)* −.16 (.07)* −.16 (.07)*
General Trust .59 (.06)*** .44 (.06)*** .44 (.06)***
General Caution .41 (.07)*** .23 (.07)** .22 (.07)**




Log Likelihood −1,600.89 −1,543.87 −1,467.97 −1,467.85
Likelihood Ratio χ2 8.99† 123.03*** 274.82*** 275.07***
Pseudo R2 .00 .04 .09 .09
Model Improvement
χ2
8.95† 111.82*** 144.32*** .25
N=971; coefficients are ordered log-odds, with standard errors in parentheses
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, † p<.1
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(coef.=.19, p<.01) on general website trust in Model 2. While this effect is sustained
for general trust across all models, general caution is no longer significantly related
to general website trust once we control for information technology knowledge
(model 3) and the experience of an adverse online event (Model 4). H2.a is fully
supported and H3.a is partially supported.
Familiar website trust displays a consistent, significant relationship with general
trust and caution. General trust is positively associated with familiar website trust
(coef.=.59, p<.001) in model 2, and this effect is sustained across all models. In
addition, general caution is positively associated with familiar website trust (coef.
=.41, p<.001) in model 2 and this effect is also sustained across all models. H2.b
and H3.b are supported.
6.3 Information Technology Knowledge
We predict that one’s self-reported knowledge about information technology will be
positively associated with both forms of website trust. Indeed, information
technology knowledge shows a strong, significant association with general website
trust (coef.=.29, p<.001) in model 3. This effect is also preserved in model 4 once
we control for the experience of an adverse online event. Information technology
knowledge is similarly associated with familiar website trust (coef.=.73, p<.001) in
model 3. As with general website trust, this effect remains in model 4. This is one of
the largest overall effects in our models, indicating that self-reported information
technology knowledge is extremely strongly associated with both types of website
trust, especially familiar website trust. As the probability profiles show (Table 4), the
predicted probability that an individual has one of the top three levels of familiar
website trust is much higher if they also indicate high information technology
knowledge, net of other factors. H4.a and H4.b are supported.
Table 4 Predicted Probabilities for Each Level of General Website Trust (GWT) and Familiar Website









GWT FWT GWT FWT GWT FWT GWT FWT
Pr(y=1|x) .01 .00 .02 .01 .00 .00 .03 .01
Pr(y=2|x) .04 .01 .04 .04 .01 .01 .07 .03
Pr(y=3|x) .12 .02 .14 .13 .04 .02 .20 .09
Pr(y=4|x) .25 .06 .27 .21 .11 .04 .30 .17
Pr(y=5|x) .37 .29 .36 .41 .34 .24 .29 .43
Pr(y=6|x) .16 .41 .14 .15 .35 .42 .09 .22
Pr(y=7|x) .04 .22 .04 .04 .15 .27 .02 .06
All variables other than X for each column are kept at the median values in each set of predicted
probabilities (age=33, educ =3.6, female =.59, online activity =2.3, general trust =4.3, general caution=
4.4, IT Knowledge =4.9, adverse online events =.48). Individual probabilities are rounded to two decimal
points
GWT General Website Trust; FWT Familiar Website Trust
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6.4 Experience of an Adverse Online Event
Our last two hypotheses predict that the experience of an adverse online event will be
negatively associated with the two forms of website trust. The fourth model in each set of
ordered logistic regressions indicates that adverse events are significantly associated with
general website trust (coef.=.−.23, p<.05). Interestingly, there is no significant effect for
adverse events on familiar website trust (coef.=−.06, p=ns). This is an interesting
finding, as it may indicate that adverse online events can hamper one’s general sense of
website trustworthiness, without affecting the sense of trust one has for their
circumscribed set of familiar websites. H5.a is supported, but H5.b is not supported.
7 Discussion
In this research, we have focused on general website trust and familiar website trust
as two distinct forms of web trust. One of our key arguments is that familiarity with
online systems through increased activity is an important part of reducing
perceptions of uncertainty in online environments. We found the expected positive
relationship between online activity and general website trust, supporting the
argument that experience with web-based systems is part of a reciprocal cycle of
online activity and general website trust. However, we did not find the predicted
relationship between online activity and familiar website trust. In fact, we found a
significant, negative association between online activity and familiar website trust
once we control for general trust and caution. This significant negative effect is
sustained even when we control for level of knowledge of information technology
and the experience of an adverse online event.
A likely explanation for the negative association of online activity with familiar
website trust is that individuals who engage in more online activity also build a clear
sense of prudence about their frequently visited websites. By definition, familiar
websites are the ones individuals interact with on a regular basis. The more practical,
first-hand experience individuals gain through online activities, the more they seem
to believe that familiar websites are not particularly trustworthy—even though,
ironically, they still use these sites. Frequent online activity allows individuals to
become informed critics. Thus, individuals who engage in frequent online activity
may build a broad sense of trust in websites in general, while simultaneously
becoming more critical of the sites and services that they regularly use.
Our next group of hypotheses dealt with the relationships between an individual’s
broad tendencies toward trusting or not trusting others (general trust), being cautious
of others or not (general caution), and the two forms of website trust. Overall, both
general trust and general caution show strong positive relationships with general and
familiar website trust. There is a clear link between general dispositions to trust
others in interpersonal interactions and to trust interactions with web-based
information systems. As the predicted probabilities in Table 4 reveal, individuals
with the greatest levels of general trust and caution are associated with the highest
amounts of general and familiar website trust. Just as in offline interactions, the most
rewarding and prudent long-term strategy may be to couple high trust with high
caution on the Internet (Cheshire et al. 2010).
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We found one interesting exception regarding the association between general
caution and general website trust: once we control for level of knowledge of
information technology (model 3), general caution is no longer significantly
associated with general website trust. Thus, it appears that one’s own knowledge
about information systems and the Internet is more critical to building general
website trust than the underlying disposition to be cautious of others. We do not find
the same drop in significance in the association between general caution and familiar
website trust. This difference in results for the two types of trust demonstrates that
competence tends to override broad dispositions to be cautious when one is
assessing an equally broad type of interaction (websites in general on the Internet).
However, when one is assessing familiar websites, the positive association between
caution and web trust is a clear indicator of prudence and self-protection. In this case
individuals who are more cautious may be insulating themselves by investing their
trust in a restricted set of websites in response to a heightened sense of uncertainty
and perceived risk.
Another key finding is the strong positive effect of level of knowledge of
information technology on perceptions of general and familiar website trust. As the
predicted probabilities in Table 4 illustrate, an individual who self-reports as highly
competent with information technology is extremely likely to be in the upper
categories (4–7) for both types of web trust, indicating high levels of trust. These
probabilities are especially pronounced for familiar website trust: the cumulative
probability of having very high familiar website trust (categories 5–7) is.92 for those
with high IT knowledge. We expected this effect because higher self-reported
knowledge of information technology (e.g., competence) should be an important part
of reducing uncertainty. Those with high IT knowledge believe they have the
capability to assess accurately the trustworthiness of the sites they use on a regular
basis (familiar website trust) as well as websites more broadly (general website
trust). Importantly, when we account for frequency of online behavior and
dispositions to trust and be cautious of others, information technology competence
remains a strong correlate of web trust.
We find that the experience of one or more adverse events online is significantly
associated with a decrease in trust in websites in general, supporting our arguments
about the experience of negative events and increased perceptions of uncertainty and
risk on the Internet. One of the most surprising findings in our study is that the
experience of an adverse online event is not related to one’s level of familiar website
trust. General website trust shows a clear, negative association with the experience of
an adverse online event, but trust in familiar websites does not rise or fall simply
because an individual has a bad incident on the Internet. One simple explanation is
that adverse events may be less likely to occur in the context of familiar websites
precisely because people might change their daily online websites after bad
experiences occur. In this way, familiar websites are self-correcting because
individuals may stop using systems that might be associated with an adverse event.
Although familiar websites can become deeply embedded in daily habits, many
people will remain sensitive to violations that occur in those contexts. Previous
research has illustrated that individuals who are high in both general trust and
general caution are particularly pro-active about managing their online risks and
develop specific attitudes about risks and uncertainties in a given context (Cheshire
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et al. 2010). Our findings do not suggest that one’s trust attitudes about familiar
websites are immune to the experience of adverse events, since we do not know
when or where these events occurred for the respondent. However, it is reasonable to
assume that individuals will choose to interact frequently with websites where the
most risky adverse events are unlikely to occur. Furthermore, if the adverse event
had nothing to do with a specific service (e.g., invasive spam email), then there is no
reason to believe that an individual would draw a connection between familiar
websites and the adverse event.
A second explanation for the lack of a relationship between adverse events and
familiar website trust is related to the perception of a committed relationship
between users and familiar, trusted websites. When people develop habits on the
web they invest in a type of relationship with the websites that they frequently visit.
Familiar websites become a part of life in the same way preferred organizations and
companies do. When individuals develop a loyal relationship with websites and then
experience an adverse event, it can create a contradictory relationship between
perceptions known in social psychology as “cognitive dissonance”. When an
individual is faced with a salient contradiction between a belief and a relevant
behavior, the individual will either escape the conflict entirely or change the belief or
behavior to reduce the incongruity (Johnson et al. 1995). In the online context, the
positive emotions and attitudes that result from website dependability can conflict
with the negative consequences of a major adverse event such as a phishing attack or
significant loss of data. If it is cumbersome or impractical to change daily habits by
avoiding websites and online interactions altogether, many individuals may resolve
the cognitive dissonance created by an adverse event by choosing to believe that the
adverse event was not so bad after all or that it is unlikely to reoccur.
8 Implications and Future Directions
According to the Internet information company Alexa.com (2010), at least half of
the top 12 websites in the world as of April 2010 are user-generated content and
social networking sites (e.g., Facebook.com, Wikipedia.com, Twitter.com, Blogger.
com), and the rest are primarily search engines and information portals (e.g., Google.
com, Yahoo.com, Live.com). Only a decade ago the primary websites were major
news websites, shopping sites and search engines. The Internet landscape is
unquestionably shifting toward sites that aggregate and share content from users
rather than from traditional, top–down news and information sources. However, the
perpetually evolving capabilities and uses of websites raise important questions
about best practices for online behavior and our ability to assess trust in complex
online information systems.
Our results demonstrate that the experience of an adverse online event is
negatively associated with general website trust, but curiously not with familiar
website trust. We have previously argued that this may be due to changes in
perception created by the reduction of the cognitive dissonance between attitudes
and behavior, the modification to one’s everyday websites in response to a negative
incident, or a combination of both of these effects. However, our inability to detect
an association between the experience of an adverse online event and familiar
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website trust might also be explained by the non-specificity of our measure of
adverse online events. Our measure captured all types of adverse online events as a
single measure, meaning that we are unable to disentangle the effects of small
problems (popup advertisements, spam email) versus larger and more destructive
events (identity theft, privacy violations, scams).
Another issue with detecting adverse online events in familiar websites is that
many threats to privacy and information control among the most popular websites
have been invisible or difficult for users to notice. Some of the most high-profile
infringements of privacy and norms of information sharing involve the largest and
most popular online websites, including Facebook.com (Sullivan 2009; Walters
2009a, b) and Google.com (Helft 2010). For example, Facebook frequently changes
its users’ privacy settings and defaults, leading some to believe that most people
must not understand the scope of what Facebook is collecting and sharing about
them (Cashmore 2010). However, the popularity and visibility of Facebook has
made it a target for lawmakers who are uncomfortable with Facebook’s policy of
automatically sharing users’ personal information without their explicit consent
(Guynn 2010). Although Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg famously declared that
“privacy is dead” (Walters 2009a), final judgment on this proclamation will depend
on how users respond to the website as it evolves over time. As individuals become
more informed about how social networking and user-generated content systems are
using and sharing personal information and data, trust in these websites is likely to
fluctuate. Detecting these changes in trust will require targeted measures of different
adverse online events as they pertain to specific websites over time.
This research also has clear implications for research practitioners and designers
who are interested in fostering and sustaining trustworthy online services and
websites. Our results corroborate earlier findings (e.g., Gefen 2000) indicating that
general trust is an essential factor in understanding what individuals actually do
online. Our findings support the assertion that general website trust is a powerful and
distinct attitude toward risk and uncertainty in web-based contexts. Indeed,
additional insights might be gained by developing trust, reliability, credibility and
security metrics for specific online systems. Importantly, our conception of general
website trust focuses attention on the medium of the web as the context for general
attitudes of confidence or caution. There are likely to be many distinctions to be
made between trust attitudes in specific web-based domains such as online
communication, financial transactions, and digital content production. With an
increased attention to general trust, and a focus on specific profiles of risk and
uncertainty, we can develop more complete and nuanced understandings of the links
between different types or levels of trust and online behavior.
Finally, our findings also have implications for the production of website policies
and the design of interfaces that are supportive of general and familiar website trust.
Our results clearly show a strong association between IT knowledge and increased
general and familiar website trust. An overarching implication of this research is that
web-based systems should actively promote policies of information-sharing through
clarity and simplicity wherever possible. Since self-reported information technology
knowledge is strongly associated with web trust, one of the best ways to increase this
knowledge is through transparency (a factor often linked to trust in other contexts).
In our view a transparent web-based system is one which is open and communicative
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about all aspects of the development, design, and operation of the system. In reality,
many systems must be less than perfectly transparent about some features due to
legal issues and concerns related to maintaining competitive advantage. However,
maintaining information transparency is typically much better than creating virtual
walls of undisclosed search algorithms and complex mechanisms for content ratings
and rankings. By reducing uncertainty about their online system, website operators
who make information transparency a design priority can empower their users and
reap the benefits of greater perceived trustworthiness. These practices can lead to
positive effects on the disposition of users to trust online systems and websites,
potentially producing a long-run advantage for the larger Internet ecosystem.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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